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Abstract 
What does urgency mean for social work today? It seems that whichever way one turns, 
a sense of urgency is prevalent: whether the persistent time pressures exerted in day-to-day 
practice, or the recurrent themes of impending crisis confronting the profession itself. 
Frequently, these strains on time and resource perpetuate a division of ‘theory’ and ‘practice’. 
In some cases, this is simply a re-assertion of the view that a social worker should get the 
practice done, and think about the theory later. But there is also a sense in which, under the 
neoliberal governance of social provision, urgency has become far more of an inherent feature 
of social work. This suggests a need to re-think the ways of acknowledging and representing 
this urgency, the problem of time that underlies the relationship between social work practice 
and theoretical inquiry, and the models of critique that can be applied to it. This paper applies 
an interdisciplinary approach to considering the impact of urgency on practice, by drawing 
together social work research with the tools of classical rhetoric and philosophy, in order to 
continue the growing discussions around the conceptual basis of social work, and in particular 
the concept of time itself within neoliberal social care. 
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What does urgency mean for social work today? It seems that whichever way one turns, 
a sense of urgency is prevalent: whether the persistent time pressures exerted in day-to-day 
practice, or the recurrent themes of impending crisis confronting the profession itself. 
Frequently, these strains on time and resource perpetuate a division of ‘theory’ and ‘practice’. 
In some cases, this is simply a re-assertion of the view that a social worker should get the 
practice done, and think about the theory later. But there is also a sense in which, under the 
neoliberal governance of social provision, urgency has become far more of an inherent feature 
of social work, and in particular the practices of ‘self-shaping’ which have historically formed 
a core element of practice. This suggests a need to re-think the ways of acknowledging and 
representing this urgency, the problem of time that underlies the relationship between social 
work practice and theoretical inquiry, and the models of critique that can be applied to it. In 
this paper, I want to – however paradoxical it may seem – take some time to consider the impact 
of urgency on practice, and its association with resource pressures and lack of time for 
theoretical discussion or reflection.  
Rather than present an exhaustive survey of literature on the topic, though, I want 
instead to take a philosophical-rhetorical approach by re-reading some representative research 
in order to continue the growing discussions around the conceptual basis of social work, and 
in particular the concept of time itself. This is important, because as well as being demanding 
and immanent, urgency is also something which is persuasive. As such, rather than 
immediately reach for one of our favourite high-level theories for an explanation and solution 
to the problems that urgency presents, there first is a need to interrogate how this persuasiveness 
is structured and formed. This is because the manner of this persuasiveness is mobile, dynamic 
and multi-layered: as well as something immanent and demanding, there is also something 
rhetorical about urgency that needs addressing if we are to take seriously the division it 
instigates between theory and practice. The purpose of this paper, then, is to explore the 
rhetorical underpinnings of urgency and their relationship to the theory-practice division within 
social work. It is important to clarify that ‘rhetoric’ is not used here as a pejorative term for 
misleading or vacuous speech, but rather to the understanding of the art of persuasion (see 
Crowley and Hawhee 1999); a persuasive discourse aimed at securing the ‘adherence of minds’ 
in a given audience (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 2008: 8). While it may seem contradictory 
to conduct a rhetorical analysis of urgency in practice – given the former requires a careful 
unpacking of issues that the latter does not afford – this paper aims to present an 
interdisciplinary dialogue between social work, philosophy and rhetoric in order to argues that 
urgency enforces a problematic distinction between theory and practice, resting on particular 
conceptions of time and space. I will suggest that a specific model of time has become dominant 
within social work discourse, which is secondary to the spatiality of practice. This model of 
time enforces a more general distinction between theory and practice, which are identifiable 
through three dimensions through which urgency appears in social work discourse: the urgency 
underlying decision-making; urgency as a symptom of complexity; and the role of urgency in 
the disciplinary strategies of insecurity and self-forming. The resources of rhetorical analysis, 
I will suggest, offer alternative ways of conceiving and framing the urgent. 
 
Time, Space, and Crisis 
Review the introductory text to new books on social work and we will typically see 
them claiming to address the most pressing and urgent questions; we will be informed that 
social work is at a crossroads; we will read about impending needs to be immediately 
addressed. Indeed, it is difficult to ignore how embedded the language of urgency has become 
within social work discourses. While there is a certain element of academic style contributing 
to this – claiming mundanity rarely gets a readership excited, after all – Donovan et al. (2017) 
have argued for a close link between broader social and economic crises and social work 
identity. Likewise, in a review of literature in the Scottish Executive’s The Role of the Social 
Worker in the 21st Century, the prominence of this sense of impending crisis is noted, not just 
in the UK but in ‘many other countries’ where ‘the nature of social work and the role of the 
social worker are also under review.’ (Asquith, Clark and Waterhouse 2005: 9) Aware of the 
historical prevalence of the language of crisis that has long accompanied discussions of social 
work identity, the report remarks: 
But even if there seen to be no “crisis” as such, for others it is clearly the case 
that social work has reached a critical stage in its development – professionally, 
structurally and organisationally […]. Less a “crisis” and more a recognition 
that social work has reached a point where change may be required. (Asquith, 
Clark and Waterhouse 2005: 8) 
One point worth noting here is that the literal meaning of crisis is a time of intense 
difficulty or danger; a time when a difficult or important decision must be made (from the 
Greek Krisis, decision). As such, it is striking that alongside the readiness of social work 
literature to identify ‘crisis’, the report follows much of the literature in offering distinctly 
spatial or territorial explanations of what is, fundamentally, a temporal figure. The report lists 
examples of crisis as the erosion of professional boundaries; the fact that much ‘social work’ 
is being carried out by non-qualified workers/carers; the failure to recruit and a shortage of 
qualified social workers; the lack of recognition amongst other professions; working conditions 
and the lack of resources necessary to allow social work to be effectively practised. Crisis is 
here represented through the lack of bodies-in-space (failure to recruit, high turnover rates, lack 
of resources), or the lack of bodies to fill space (the space of social work intruded upon, the 
collapsing of boundaries between the social worker and other professionals or para-
professionals).  
In some senses, this articulation of social work in spatial (rather than temporal) terms 
should not be surprising. The very fact that social work is, in McBeath and Webb’s words, a 
‘contingent non-linear task’ of ‘complex indeterminate work’ (2002: 1018) means that its 
expertise is structured, at least in part, by its situated locality. Social work is a practice, and 
practice is identified through place. As Roger Smith argues:  
in order to achieve a holistic approach to practice, social workers must first 
bring an appreciation of their own structural location and the associated 
“baggage” which exercises significant influence on both the opportunities 
available to them and the constraints which they experience. The place which 
the social worker occupies and the perceptions associated with this are thus 
implicated in all aspects of practice. (Smith 2008: 193, my emphasis) 
It follows that, when social work identity is considered to be in crisis, the role of time 
typically emerges as a consequence of the spatializing or ‘placement’ of practice. For example, 
the British Association of Social Work’s ‘80/20’ campaign in 2018 (see 
https://www.basw.co.uk/system/files/resources/FINAL%2080-20%20report.pdf) – the name 
deriving from the discovery that children’s social workers spent 80% of their time on 
administrative tasks and 20% in direct contact with service users provides one example of this. 
The spatial constraints of administrative work means that there is not enough time for the 
location of practice to be realised. At the same time, the emphasis on the spatiality of practice 
may come at the expense of closer analysis of the temporal effects of urgency, as well as how 
this shapes the relationship between theory and practice.  
To explore this in more detail, I want to break down the different aspects of urgency in 
this context. One way of doing this is to use the classical distinction between different modes 
of proof: logos (rational proof), pathos (emotional proof) and ethos (proof based on character). 
Using this as a model, the following sections explore how urgency is not simply the absence 
of time, but also a logos (a technicity of decision-making), a pathos (a sense of insecurity 
derived from the complexities of neoliberal care systems), and an ethos (a particular form of 
self-creating discipline), which frames social work’s responses to social problems.  
 
Urgency and Decision 
Perhaps the most straightforward way of understanding urgency within a social work 
context is to align it with decision-making. Indeed, in the Health and Care Professions Council 
(HCPC) framework which regulated social workers in England until the end of 2019, the word 
urgency appeared only once, under ‘assessment’: a core social work skill is to assess the 
urgency of a case and prioritise accordingly.  
Decision-making involves a complicated interaction between theory and practice, 
through which the latter supersedes the former. In an interview discussing the social analysis 
of neoliberalism since 1989, postcolonial theorist Dipesh Chakrabarty suggests that when we 
make a decision, ‘the world intrudes into our thinking as a question of urgency.’ (2017: 90) 
The more urgent the decision to be made is, the more abruptly we have to stop thinking 
theoretically, given the endless possibilities theory may throw at us. Urgency can ‘cut short’ 
thinking, Chakrabarty remarks, even if where it stops may be quite arbitrary. In the HCPC 
context, this arbitrariness is due to urgency being an imposition on a varied and multiple 
number of questions a social worker could be asking about their assessments: what factors of 
the client’s context, actions and relationships they have considered out of the infinite 
differences within practice (a point that Aristotle first made in the Nichomachean Ethics). 
There is no clear stopping point where theoretical reflection naturally reaches a decision by 
itself, because there will always other perspectives to consider, alternative meanings, histories, 
translations, genealogies and so on.  
But what is the nature of this imposition of practice into theory? Clearly, urgency does 
not just impose the recognition of a lack of time, or limited time. Rather, Chakrabarty’s point 
suggests that the force of urgency is better understood as a specific distance imposed between, 
on the one hand, assessment decisions made (practice), and on the other, critique or reflection 
(theory). Understanding urgency in this way allows us to move beyond any unhelpful 
equivocation of urgency with simply ‘lack of time.’ Contrary to Chakrabarty’s claim, though, 
I do not agree that decision-making makes us stop theorising altogether. The notion of urgency 
as a forced decision compels us rather to adopt a certain model of thinking, and agency; which 
is itself based on perpetuating a certain distance between theory and practice. Perhaps the best 
illustration of how this distance is produced and maintained can be seen with the application 
of particular time- and risk- management strategies to local practice, explicitly in order to deal 
with stress and anxiety borne from an over-saturation of urgency. For example, an article in 
the online social work magazine Community Care talks about dealing with stress through the 
management of time. It does this by using the ‘Eisenhower distinction’ between activities 
which have an outcome that leads to us achieving personal or professional goals (which are 
‘important’ activities), and those which demand immediate attention, usually around achieving 
someone else's goals (which are ‘urgent’ activities, because the consequences of not doing them 
are more clearly visible): 
Go back to understanding “how much” time you can spend on resolving the 
issue that comes up unexpectedly. Importance and urgency are different and 
they love to compete. My advice? Manage urgency effectively (i.e. what CAN 
you do?) and focus on importance. (Betts 2015, online) 
The article is clear that urgency is something to be managed, whereas importance is 
more intuitive: what is ‘important’ is for you to decide (even if the conditions of urgency are 
rarely the responsibility of the individual). This is persuasive, fundamentally, because of an 
implicit binary it draws between the subject and the object of the discourse. The objective 
technicalities of the urgent are managed by the subjective appraisal of what is important to you 
(the non-technical, human social worker). In this way, the representation of urgency here draws 
upon and maintains a familiar set of dichotomies, where one side is privileged as more valuable 
than the other: object-subject, technical-human, bureaucratic-relational.  
There are two points of interest around this binary representation of urgency as form of 
decision-making. Firstly, the alignment of the urgent with the bureaucratic and technical and 
the important with the personal risks what political theorist Wendy Brown calls a 
‘depoliticization’ at work in the substitution of ‘emotional and personal vocabularies for 
political ones in formulating solutions to […] problems.’ (2006: 16) Replacing questions of 
social justice – why does the social worker have to decide between urgent and important in the 
first place? What resources have been taken away to prompt the decision? – with a therapeutic 
or behavioural one provides both a rhetoric of empowerment through individualisation, and a 
consolidation of responsibility on the individual alone. Secondly, and more importantly to the 
topic at hand, the association of ‘urgent’ issues with measurable, objective markers risks 
overstating the capacity one has to differentiate ‘urgency’ from ‘importance’. To put it another 
way, the distance between decision and critique or reflection which this rhetoric of urgency 
insists upon seems to also imply a certain timelessness of critique. The distinction between the 
urgent and the important heavily implies that the former is allied to time demands, while the 
latter escapes those demands (and hence, ‘important’ is something distinct from ‘urgent’). If 
urgency imposes time restrictions, then this can be ‘managed’; but managed in what time? 
This implicit binary is often seen in the promotion of theoretical inquiry in social work 
more generally. The lack of time pressure is promoted, quite rightly, as one of the benefits of 
theorising. Gray and Webb argue that the ‘joy of “thinking social work” is in creating 
alternative modes of understanding through critical engagement with competing perspectives.’ 
(Gray and Webb 2013: 7) Typically, theory is considered within the (hopefully) safe havens of 
supervisions or University modules, where scenarios can be replayed and revisited, or the 
traditional ‘case study’ text-box examined. The problem, however, is that without a sense of 
time at work in our critical reflections, we stop paying attention to what we might in fact be 
bracketing when we bracket time. Indeed, a range of social, material, interpretative and 
temporal considerations are likely to be ignored in this model of ‘timeless’ case studies. Roger 
Smith (2008) relates how a colleague of his suggests that power in social work can be framed 
entirely by the notion of ‘lateness’, and the ways in which this is defined, experience and 
justified. Power relations are expressed in the differing ways in which ‘being late’ is dealt with 
in transactions between agencies, practitioners and service users – who is held accountable, for 
example. In this way, removing the temporality of an example can lead critique can become a 
deceptively uncritical performance; time can be the hidden carrier of materialities of practice. 
There are important reasons for understanding these temporal materialities of practice. 
If there is a distance between the decision and critique or reflection – between practice and 
theory, effectively – then the main tool of decision becomes technical, rather than critical or 
reflective. The routes to ‘managing’ the pressures of urgency are found in assessment tools, 
decision-making frameworks and so on. As a result, the persuasiveness of this urgency is not 
as straightforward as a manager telling a social worker to make a decision, or the needs of the 
service user determining a quick response. Instead, its rhetorical power is embedded within the 
technological and bureaucratic regimes that allow decisions to be made. As is well-known, the 
landmark Munro Review of Child Protection in England (2011) identified the way in which a 
managerial preoccupation with timeliness, recording, procedural compliance, standardised 
assessment, productivity measurement and risk aversion was detracting from the ‘quality 
decision-making informed by a relational approach to knowing and doing in social work 
practice.’ As many have argued, these technical tools frequently privilege certain kinds of 
knowledge over and above others: knowledge which serves certain models of government and 
state control (see, for example, Tsui 2004), and devalued other possible models of expertise 
rooted in the ‘ground-level’ workings of everyday wisdom, community-focused interpretation 
and user-based alternatives. Parton and O’Byrne famously identified this as a distinction 
between the ‘technical-rational’ and the ‘practical-moral’ approaches to practice (2000: 30-1). 
Healy points out that the ‘dominant discourses’ governing the technical-rational approach to 
social work, broadly construed – biomedicine, economics and law – are all ‘strongly aligned 
with Enlightenment ideals of objectivity, rationality, individualism and linear notions of 
progress. In many health and welfare institutions, these discourses profoundly influence what 
counts as true, right and rational ways of proceeding.’ (Healy 2005: 18; see also Thyer 2009) 
In this way, it is less the content of the individual tools themselves, and more the 
epistemological assumptions contained within such techniques of decision-making which 
shape urgency in practice.  
The expectation that objective and rationally progressive techniques would enhance the 
predictability of outcomes at first appears to help social workers deal with urgency. But as the 
Munro review demonstrated, in many cases it has ironically promoted another form of urgency 
as a consequence: that is, they produce an accelerated expectation that the ‘right’ decision will 
be made. Thus, if the urgency of decision-making imposes a distance between practice and 
critique, it would seem that the specific distance utilised by technical-rational approaches result 
in uncertainty, rather than the completion they promise. Correspondingly, there seems to be a 
link between the need to manage urgency – to keep things moving on time, and to keep social 
work technically efficient – and the very prevalence of urgency; a point which leads Cynthia 
Gallop to note: 
the growing neoliberal momentum toward theories and practices that bring 
order, predictability, and cohesion to our profession has begun to tip the balance 
in the social work profession in a manner that has many in the field questioning 
who we are, and what we actually do. (Gallop 2013: 2) 
 
Urgency and Complexity 
Gallop notes the ‘neoliberal momentum’ at work in some of this drive for time 
management, and this leads us on to the next rhetoric of urgency. Urgency also emerges as part 
of the complexity of situating social care in the global world today. Urgency is, in this sense, a 
key component of neoliberalism, and the effects it has had on social work and social care to 
date.  
Neoliberalism has become a term denoting the bogeyman of social policy, despite 
widespread ambiguity over its precise meaning; indeed, in some cases, this ambiguity is 
precisely how it appears to be such a bogeyman. As Andrew Whelan notes, ‘neoliberalisation 
is not a coherent and tangible force in the world; it is a label ascribed to an unpredictable array 
of such forces in unpredictable motion, usually in dialogue with other, often contradictory 
forces.’ (Whelan 2015: 8; see also Clarke 2008) In principle, liberalism is a utilitarian method, 
and lends itself to utilitarian ethics: rational and calculative based on the ends justifying the 
means. However, late modern capitalism is somewhat paradoxically characterised by an excess 
of anti-rational, anti-utilitarian actions. Risk and short-termism is prioritised over the retreat of 
government into administration; steadfast growth is replaced with chaos and abrupt change; 
and, Franco Berardi nargues, ‘conditions of info-acceleration and hypercomplexity’ (2012: 12) 
mean that the epistemology of prediction and certainty – the technical-rational methods – 
become dysfunctional within neoliberal governed social care. 
Neoliberalism is driven by the urgency of its own inevitability: as Margaret Thatcher 
once famously said, ‘there is no alternative’; while Mark Fisher commented that ‘it is easier to 
imagine the end of the world than it is the end of capitalism’ (2009: 1). But the ‘omnipotence’ 
of neoliberalism (Clarke 2008) this translates into a complex urgency on a ground level, as the 
work of Vassilus Karagkounis demonstrates. Following the 2008 financial crisis, neoliberal 
policies instigated harsh austerity policies, which inevitably meant increased workloads for 
social workers and the shrinking of the workforce due to cuts in social care budgets. In his 
work on austerity measures in Greece and its effect on social work, Karagkounis argues that 
the effects of austerity highlight the shortcomings of the prevalent methods of social work, 
which are based on medical or functional models of casework at an individual and family level. 
But this, he argues, has fallen short for two reasons: first, the limits are reached when more 
than a set number of individuals need help (as there is not enough time or resource): but 
furthermore, the complexity of the broader problems, and the necessity of linking personal 
welfare with wider economic policies, means that the shortcomings of casework are exposed 
by austerity measures. While casework may still be helpful for alleviating short-term problems 
for service users, Karagkounis suggests it is shown up for its shortcomings. 
Despite these inevitable variations [of austerity], the impact of neo-liberal 
policies poses a significant challenge to social workers in terms of effectively 
responding to rapidly changing socioeconomic conditions and to complex and 
deepening problems that many individuals, families and communities face. 
(Karagkounis 2017: 652) 
Urgency this manifests itself in two ways, from this practice-based perspective. Firstly, 
individual ‘cases’ are harder to separate from the broader changes around them. As the 
economies of states become increasingly interdependent, Stanford (2010) has argued that risk 
is used within neo-liberal societies to mobilise fear as an emotive medium for advancing the 
values of safety and security. As a result, how social workers view themselves: 
has become dominated by the legions of polarised identities that cumulate 
around notions of risk—dangerousness and vulnerability, independence and 
dependence, responsibility and irresponsibility, trustworthiness and 
untrustworthiness, culpability and innocence. Within this analysis, 
overwhelming fear operates as a core constituent for defining the personal 
experience of risk within contemporary society. (Stanford 2010 p.1066; see also 
Webb 2006) 
The almost unfathomable complexity of the neoliberal economic field results in a range 
of competing insecurities which effectively hold up and support the delivery of government. 
This prompts a second sense of urgency, which is specifically related to how social movements 
have attempted to respond to the current world economic order. That is the need for a non-
complex, and often binary, response: the good versus the bad. We see this on a grander scale 
in politics: the more complex the world, the more urgent the desire to see a really good good 
guy, or really bad bad guy; what Berardi describes as an aggressive desire for identity to fill 
the void where traditional heroism has been unable to sustain itself in late capitalism (Berardi 
2015: 5). 
This rush for an answer has a knock-on effect for the relationship between theory and 
practice. Karagkounis sees the return to critical social work, or the Global Social Work 
Agenda, as the only route to resist austerity. But the radical social work tradition for its 
‘idealistic theoretical prescriptions of critical thinking’ (Ferguson 2013: 119), which remains 
premised on negative critiques that lead, Harry Ferguson argues, to only platitudes and 
superficial gestures towards social change that, in fact, restrict a deeper discussion. While I am 
sympathetic to this particular criticism, Ferguson also suggests that the real problem is that this 
offers no practical solutions. But the point of ‘urgent complexity’ is precisely that a clear 
practical solution will not simply “appear” in neat and representative ways. As such, 
Ferguson’s critique falls short by maintaining the division between theory and practice, while 
effectively leaving the ways in which urgency is persuasive to one side.  
 
Urgency and Discipline 
What is at stake in leaving this to one side, though? In his later work, Foucault (1997, 
2008) uses the ancient Greek term askēsis to discuss how the self is exercised and trained and, 
through such training, transformed. For Foucault, this ancient emphasis on ‘taking care of 
oneself’ has been superseded by the drive to ‘know oneself’ (McGushin 2007: 31), resulting in 
the taking for granted of relationships between power, subjectivity and truth. However, it could 
well be argued that this originary notion of an ethical transformative ‘training’ of the self has 
been core to social work throughout its history. The development of a service user’s ‘character’ 
was fundamental to the moral idealism of the Charity Organisation Societies of the late 19th 
century in England. Working with the hidden depths of the self was key to the shift to 
psychoanalytic approaches to social work in the interwar period, and in the 1970’s, enabling 
‘self-actualisation’ was a key mantra of the therapeutic turn in social work. Today, models of 
casework and person-centred practice compete with critical social work and the structural 
understanding of identity over the most appropriate tools of self-development (Pierson 2011: 
199-203; Grimwood 2016: 127-8). Likewise, the neoliberal context in which these models 
compete is itself built less on an explicit ideology, and more on a number of techniques of self-
shaping which model service users and service delivers as economic agents. Foucault famously 
talks of the neoliberal subject emerging as an ‘entrepreneur of himself’ (2008: 226), through 
the practices of ‘normative reason’ embedded within neoliberal policies (Brown 2015: 30). 
Understanding these as fundamentally ethical practices – that is to say, contributing to a 
persuasiveness based on the ethos or ‘self’ within an argument – provides a ground on which 
to consider the ways in which the theory-practice division manifests itself within the current 
context of neoliberal social care.  
In 1981 Margaret Thatcher ominous declared that: ‘economics are the method; the 
object is to change the heart and soul.’ (Butt 1981) The effects of this change on hearts and 
souls is documented by Berardi, who notes that social psychology has ‘remarked that two 
pathologies are of great actuality in these last decades of liberalist hyper-capitalism: panic and 
depression.’ (2009:c100) Once, the problem of social relations was alienation. Now, Berardi 
argues, the problem is over-connection. Along similar lines, the psychologist Jeff Sugarman 
has worked specifically on the ways in which the urgency of neoliberalism affects the psyche. 
He writes: 
In neoliberalism, governing occurs by providing individuals with choices and 
holding them accountable for the choices they make. However, many of the life 
choices with which individuals are now faced are the result of reduced 
government services that, in effect, transfers risk from the state to individuals. 
Risk and uncertainty are nothing new. But, in the climate of neoliberal 
economics, there is less and less separating those who pursue risk intentionally 
for profit, from the rest of us for whom it is being woven ideologically into the 
fabric of everyday life, whether it is matters of personal health, the care and 
education of our children, the increasing unpredictability of employment, or 
dignity in old age. Along with increased risk, the current emphasis on choice, 
autonomy, and self-reliance insinuates failure as self-failure, for which one is 
expected to bear sole responsibility. There is diminishing appreciation that 
individuals’ predicaments are a product of more than simply their individual 
choice, and include access to opportunities, how opportunities are made 
available, the capacity to take advantage of opportunities offered, and a host of 
factors regarding personal histories and the exigencies of lives. (Sugarman 
2015: 105; see also Salecl 2010) 
This collapsing of the private and public self suggests that we cannot simply turn to 
practice or reality to escape what urgency does to theory. As Matko Krce-Ivančić argues, 
‘anxiety relentlessly reminds the neoliberal subject that she has not yet done enough on herself,’ 
(2018: 263) and as such is not simply a side effect of the disciplinary processes, but is in fat 
key in establishing what he terms ‘neoliberal subjectivty’ (274). Individuals are left to 
themselves, but are still ‘overseen’ through the establishment of fields of power and practice. 
In the UK, this has been seen profoundly with the personalisation agenda, whereby service 
users are given private budgets to have autonomy over their care. But the problem is that the 
time it takes for state services to be withdrawn is quicker than new services take to be created; 
hence Burton comments that ‘“Personalisation” is a bureaucratic word for a bureaucratic 
response to the political failure of social care.’ (Burton 2010: 301) For Ehrenberg, depression 
develops ‘after the disciplinary behavioural models and the rules of authority… that assigned 
a destiny to social classes and gender collapsed faced with the new norms pushing each and 
everyone to individual action, forcing individuals to become themselves.’ (cited in Berardi 
2009: 99) He goes on: ‘the responsibility of our lives is now fully assigned to each of us. 
Depression manifests itself as pathology of responsibility, dominated by the feeling of 
inadequateness.’ Berardi comments: ‘happiness is not a matter of science, but of ideology.’ 
(90) 
 
Rethinking time: from Chronos to Kairos 
The point of this paper is not, however, to repeat the well-worn critiques of neoliberal 
self-shaping. Where, though, do these three ‘proofs’ or persuasive conditions leave our opening 
question on the meaning of urgency? Writers like Sugarman and Berardi demonstrate how 
neoliberal disciplining interweaves rationality, emotional response, and models of the self; 
thus, while this rhetorical analysis has pointed to three dimensions of urgency, and aligned 
them with the three classical models of proof (logos, pathos and ethos), these are, of course, 
frequently interlinked. For example, the requirement on a social worker for meeting targets 
may appear to be the domination of a logical argument; however, it tends to elicit both pathos 
responses and ethos (as the BASW 80/20 report found, the space in which the social worker 
has to complete bureaucracy requires a change in character, or change in assumption of self).  
But these dimensions of urgency raise another point for rhetorical consideration. This 
is the way that urgency typically manifests itself in terms of a chronological form of time. That 
is: discourses of urgency are dominated by a linear form of time that can be measured and 
quantified, such that the demands of time rest within corresponding forms of knowledge and 
practices of knowing. If we are to continue examining urgency through a rhetorical lens, we 
can note at this point that classical rhetoric often employed two concepts of time: chronos, 
which was linear, measurable time, and Kairos, which was a more situational kind of time, 
perhaps close to ‘opportunity’ in English or ‘opening’. 
A Kairos-based discourse does not seek certainty prior to writing, but rather 
views writing and speaking themselves as opportunities for exploring issues and 
making knowledge. A rhetoric that privileges Kairos as a principle of invention 
does not present a list of rules… but rather… is not only attuned to the history 
of an issue (chronos), but is also aware of the more precise turns the arguments 
surrounding an issue have taken and when they took these turns. (Crowley and 
Hawhee 1999: 35) 
Kairos thus refers to a ‘timely or appropriate moment’. This concept was largely 
neglected in the Enlightenment, as it was not well-suited to the rational and predictable 
grounding of modern knowledge. A ‘passing instant’ is not teachable, and at odds with the 
planning, strategizing and management of technical processes. Kairos, according to Hawhee, 
marks the ‘emergence of a pro-visional subject, one that works on – and is worked on by – the 
situation.’ (2002: 19) So it is not just a moment which ‘we’ seize – in the classic neoliberal 
mantra – but rather one that mediates subject and context, time and place. Neoliberal 
chronology, in particular, emphasises the crisis of individual decision; Kairos focuses on the 
broader fluctuating interactions between individual and context. 
The space-time configuration of Kairos offers a different lens for thinking about 
urgency. The idea of opportunity or moment seems perhaps one way of countering the urgency 
of calculation and measured chronos, without relying on a disciplinary territorialism built upon 
binary oppositions – social worker/health worker, theory/practice and so on. Too often, this 
binary opposition is implicit in the call for a more embodied and dynamic model of social work 
– such as the ‘technical rational’ versus the ‘practical moral’ of Parton and O’Byrne – which, 
I have argued, can bracket temporal issues that obscure some important material aspects of 
practice. Two examples may help to suggest how Kairotic time translates into social work, in 
light of the previous three ways in which urgency is persuasive in determining the relationship 
between theory and practice. 
1. Ian Hyslop proposes the idea of social work offering an ‘in-between’: social work 
provides a ‘socially configured understanding’ arising ‘from the practice of social work 
in the space between the poor and the powerful.’ (2018: 20-1) This knowledge, Hyslop 
argues, furnishes social work with a distinctive ‘identity claim’. As an example of this 
in action, Hyslop cites ‘a very experienced and inter-personally flexible hospital social 
worker who spoke of working with multiply disadvantaged people so that they are not 
‘lost’, [and] described explaining the need to record social history with a client in order 
to humanise individuals within the wider clinical system.’ The social worker said: 
…we’re doing this because it’s really important in the hospital notes that you’re 
not seen as just a diagnosis or a number – that you’re seen as a person who’s 
got kids and that…It always works, but I do mean it genuinely. 
This is one example of what Hyslop argues shows ‘social work occupies an 
intermediate location’ (27); a focus on juggling, balancing, bridging and relationships, 
within the confines of systems built on the urgent requirement to increase efficiency. 
While Hyslop – as other writers have – insists on the intermediacy of location and 
spatiality, this invocation of historical time opens up an important aspect of the in-
between-ness he describes. 
2. As we have seen, in his work on austerity in Greece, Karagkounis argues that his 
preferred response is to ‘revive the radical tradition of social work’. He argues that this 
is ‘a necessity of our times; social work owes it as much to itself and its foundational 
values of equality and justice as it does to its citizen clients.’ (652) Here, Karagkounis 
follows a general characteristic of critical social work writing, by calling on particular 
histories of social work: not simply as a descriptive account of how we got to be where 
we are, but also as a motivational device to inspire the ‘critical’ aspect of social work 
practice (one sees something similar in Michael Reisch’s historical accounts of social 
work (2002), for example, which has been criticised precisely for its over-emphasis on 
social work’s radical contribution to society at the expense of its more humdrum, or 
less effective, components). 
While these are both examples of social work using temporal stories – of the client, or 
of the profession – the point of their success is not their chronological rhetoric. Simply 
reminding a hospital that a client has a history is not effective in itself, and neither is Reisch’s 
history always accurate. The point is not that they are temporal, but that they are timely. This 
timeliness – knowing when to speak of the radical history of social work, knowing when to 
insert the client’s social history into their hospital management – seems to be key to the in-
between-ness that Hyslop describes; but also something that does not necessarily commit the 
social worker to a ‘practical-moral’ position outside of the technicalities of assessment and so 
on. It is view of time that is about opportunity and meeting in the moment – time in the form 
of Kairos – rather than simply escaping the ordered and functional demands of time.  
The principle of a Kairotic social work does not, of course, provide immediate answers 
to the multiple problems that the rhetoric of urgency poses in and of itself. But I would argue 
that reconceptualising the persuasiveness of urgency in terms of the timeliness of moments is 
a step towards avoiding the distancing of theory and practice in their conventional binaries. 
Furthermore, it offers a route into a number of conceptual approaches that might provide a 
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